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SUMMARY:Why common cause explanation is not the main business of historica
 l reconstruction - Adrian Currie (Centre for the Study of Existential Risk
 )
DTSTART:20170201T130000Z
DTEND:20170201T143000Z
UID:TALK70719@talks.cam.ac.uk
CONTACT:31287
DESCRIPTION:It’s sometimes thought that the historical sciences -- archa
 eology\, \npaleontology and geology\, for instance -- are substantively di
 fferent \nfrom other\, ‘experimental’\, sciences. In making such claim
 s\, abstract \naccounts of scientific methods are often contrasted. A comm
 on story \nabout historical reconstruction is that it relies on common cau
 se \nexplanation:  we uncover the past by discovering surprising correlati
 ons \nbetween traces\, and then hypothesizing events in the past which wou
 ld \nunify them.  But what is the warrant for such inferences\, and is it 
 \nactually the main business of historical reconstruction?  To the first \
 nquestion\, I argue that appealing to common causes is often justified\, \
 nbut not on the grounds thus far suggested.  Where others prefer common \n
 cause reasoning to be justified on some global\, a priori or a posteriori 
 \nfact\, I argue that that they are justified on local a posteriori \ngrou
 nds.  To the second question\, I concede that the identification of \ncomm
 on causes is an important aspect of historical construction\, but \nargue 
 that taking it as the central method of historical reconstruction \nis imp
 overished and can’t explain such science’s successes.  I’ll \ndiscus
 s how the richness of our understanding of past causal milieus \noften pla
 ys a central role in warranting historical reconstruction\, and \nclose by
  making some suggestions about how philosophers ought to \napproach eviden
 tial reasoning in the sciences.
LOCATION:Seminar Room 2\, Department of History and Philosophy of Science
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