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SUMMARY:How can we homologize holobionts\, and whose lineage matters? - Ca
 therine Kendig (Michigan State University)
DTSTART:20170510T120000Z
DTEND:20170510T133000Z
UID:TALK72553@talks.cam.ac.uk
CONTACT:31287
DESCRIPTION:With some notable exceptions (Hall 1992\, 2003\, 2012\; Minell
 i 1996\, 2003\; \nBrigandt 2007\; Love 2007\; Ereshefsky 2012\, Wagner 201
 6)\, the continued \ndebate over the meaning of homology within philosophy
  and history of \nbiology over the last 25 years has focused on defining h
 omology rather \nthan on its use in practice. Those focusing on scientific
  practice in a \nnumber of disciplines from linguistics to chemistry claim
  that knowledge \nis always understood with reference to a particular cont
 ext and in light \nof the actions of epistemic agents. Knowledge-making ac
 tivities are not \nthe result of universal rules for deriving explanation 
 from facts but \nthe result of critical intersubjective modes of investiga
 tion in \n“systems of practice” (Chang 2012\, 2016).\nIt would seem th
 en that taking a science-in-practice approach would\, if \nused to underst
 and the meaning and role of homology\, turn attention to \nthe activities 
 of homologizing and communication between scientists in \norder to charact
 erize the nature of inquiry within comparative biology \n(Kendig 2016). Bu
 t does this emphasis on practice imply a kind of \neliminitivism with rega
 rd to metaphysics? If not\, what is the \nrelationship between the underly
 ing metaphysical commitments that make \nhomologizing possible\, (e.g.\, n
 on-empirical considerations)\, empirical \npractices\, and knowledge-makin
 g activities? I employ Chakravartty’s \n(2017) notion of “metaphysical
  inference” in order to suggest an \nalternative practice-based approach
 . In doing so I attempt to show how \nmetaphysical inference affects homol
 ogizing activities in at least three \nways: 1) in the articulation of the
  nature of continuity\, 2) the \nspecification of the units of comparison\
 , and 3) the individuation of \nparts.\nAn attempt to answer the question 
 which is the title of this talk\, How \ncan we homologize holobionts\, and
  whose lineage matters?\, is made by \ninvestigating how specific metaphys
 ical inferences work\, in situ\, for \nlichen physiology and classificatio
 n. Lichens are made up of multiple \norganisms that can themselves be memb
 ers of three kingdoms. I explore \nwhat the nature of continuity and indiv
 iduation means for being a lichen \nand how lichenologists consider lineag
 e.
LOCATION:Seminar Room 2\, Department of History and Philosophy of Science
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