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SUMMARY:Incentivizing Participation in Resource-sharing Networks - Richard
  Weber (Cambridge)
DTSTART:20071010T130000Z
DTEND:20071010T140000Z
UID:TALK8603@talks.cam.ac.uk
CONTACT:Speaker to be confirmed
DESCRIPTION:Broadband networking allow agents to share distributed resourc
 es. In a peer-to-peer networks\, a data file can be shared nonrivalrously\
 , because any number of agents can read it at the same time. In grid compu
 ting\, computing power is shared rivalrously\, but it can be multiplexed t
 hrough time\, since if one agent is not using his computer at some instanc
 e then another agent may. The raison d'etre for such systems is that they 
 are self-financing and that each agent is better off contributing resource
 s to a shared pool than he would be otherwise. The problem for a system de
 signer is to arrange things\, using simple enforceable rules\, fees\, etc.
 \, so that heterogenous agents are incentivized to make socially efficient
  decisions about the sizes of their contributions to the common resource p
 ool. Free-riders should be prevented\, since this can make the system coll
 apse. (Think of a large grid computing network in which the sharing rule i
 s "equal shares". A given agent may as well decide to contribute 0\, since
  he stills obtain the same share as any other agent. But if all agents con
 tribute 0 then the system becomes useless.) \nI will present a optimizatio
 n model that captures salient features of the above problem. A reoccuring 
 theme of "solutions" is that we must prevent agents who value the system h
 ighly from masquerading as those who do not\, and so it may be optimal to 
 prevent the latter type of agent from participating at all. \n\n
LOCATION:MR12\, CMS\, Wilberforce Road\, Cambridge\, CB3 0WB
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