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SUMMARY:Natural purposes\, Kantian analogies and environmental ethics - An
 gela Breitenbach (Sidney Sussex College\, Cambridge)
DTSTART:20080124T163000Z
DTEND:20080124T180000Z
UID:TALK9560@talks.cam.ac.uk
CONTACT:Lauren Kassell
DESCRIPTION:Recent theories in environmental ethics are divided over the q
 uestion whether we can ascribe intrinsic value to nature. According to ant
 hropocentric approaches the sole locus of value is the human being and any
  obligation to protect our natural environment is ultimately reducible to 
 a concern about humans. Biocentric accounts\, by contrast\, claim that nat
 ure has an absolute and intrinsic worth and that human beings therefore ha
 ve a direct duty towards nature. While the anthropocentric perspective may
  be criticised for presenting nature merely as a resource for satisfying h
 uman needs and desires\, biocentric approaches face the apparently insuper
 able problem of justifying the existence of independent value in nature. I
 n this paper I develop an account which aims to overcome these difficultie
 s by attributing to nature a value that is independent of its usefulness t
 o human beings without making this value independent from the rational val
 uer. The account is inspired by Kant’s analogical conception of purposes
  in nature. This may come as a surprise to those who view Kant as the chie
 f exponent of anthropocentrism.
LOCATION:Seminar Room 2\, History and Philosophy of Science\, Department o
 f
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